Fast and large-angle attitude slew maneuvers often imply simultaneous use of multiple actuators such as thrusters and reaction wheels (RWs). A fault in any of these actuators might lead to partial or full damage of sensitive spacecraft instruments. In this paper, a modelbased Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) strategy is proposed, which aims at detecting various actuator faults, such as stuck-open/closed thruster, thruster leakage, loss of effectiveness of all thrusters, and change of RW friction torque due to change of Coulomb and/or viscosity factor. The proposed FDI strategy is also able to detect and isolate faults affecting the RWs tachometer sensor. The FDI system design is based on a multiplicative extended Kalman filter and a generalized likelihood ratio thresholding of the residual signals. The performance and robustness of the proposed FDI strategy is evaluated using Monte Carlo simulations and carefully defined FDI performance indices. Preliminary results suggest promising performance in terms of detection/isolation times, miss-detection/isolation rates, and false alarm rates.
INTRODUCTION
Spacecraft agility, meaning the capability of the spacecraft to change its attitude by performing fast attitude slew maneuvers or to follow a given attitude profile with high precision, is becoming more and more important for future space missions. These requirements demand the spacecraft to be equipped with actuators, such as thrusters and reaction wheels (RWs), capable of generating high reaction torques and perform attitude maneuvers with high angular rates. The control of the spacecraft attitude is achieved by the Attitude and Orbit Control System (AOCS), which includes sensors and actuators that are not exempt of faults. An incorrect AOCS fault management may cause severe degradation of the spacecraft performance and/or cause damage to sensitive spacecraft instruments.
A quick Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) system is crucial for a successful fault recovery action (e.g., switching to redundant hardware and/or employing a new controller). Model-based FDI techniques, in general, gained a great deal of attention in the past decades and, in particular, they show great potential for aerospace applications, see Marzat et al. (2012) for a recent survey. The majority of published works on AOCS fault diagnosis focuses on faults occurring in a particular type of actuator or a particular type of sensor. For instance, sole thruster and RW faults were studied in Fonod et al. (2015b) and in Meskin and Khorasani (2007) , respectively. Gyroscope sensor faults were studied in Venkateswaran et al. (2002) . Only very few examples of model-based FDI systems dealing with a combination of different type of actuators or sensors exist for agile spacecraft. Patton et al. (2008) considered gyroscope and thruster faults, whereas Hou et al. (2008) focused on gyroscope and RW faults combinations.
An example of agile spacecraft that makes use of multiple actuators working simultaneously is the Athena (Advanced Telescope for High-ENergy Astrophysics) spacecraft, an L-class mission of the European Space Agency, which aims at addressing the Hot and Energetic Universe science theme. The Athena spacecraft is required to be agile in order to rapidly re-point its instruments, while protecting its sensitive instruments from direct sun light. The attitude re-pointing may imply realization of fast largeangle attitude slews. To perform such slews, the Athena spacecraft is equipped with a set of thrusters and RWs to provide accurate control torques.
Torques generated by RWs and thrusters may have similar impact on the spacecraft dynamics. Therefore, a fault in any of these actuators might produce a similar effect on the spacecraft dynamics. Thus, the isolation part of an FDI system design becomes challenging since no sensors can directly measure the delivered torques by such actuators. In this paper, we propose a standalone FDI strategy capable of detecting and isolating certain faults occurring in the thrusters, RWs, and RW tachometer sensors.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this paper, we assume the spacecraft (s/c) is equipped with a set of N T thrusters and a set of N R RWs, which may suffer from various faults detailed in the sequel.
Thruster Model
Defining S T {1, 2, . . . , N T } as a set of all thrusters indices, d i ∈ R 3×1 as a fixed direction of the i th thruster, r Mi ∈ R 3×1 as a vector position of the i th thruster in bodyfixed reference frame, and F Ni > 0 as a maximum thrust force of the ith thruster, then the maximum directional torque of the i th thruster becomes
where '×' denotes the cross product of two vectors and b Fi is the directional force of the i th thruster, i.e.,
with θ(·, ·) being a function that rotates the i th thruster direction vector (d i ) for a given misalignment angle Ti and η Fi being a scalar zero-mean Gaussian white-noise aiming at modeling variations on the effective thruster force.
Finally, the total torque about the Center of Mass (CoM) of the s/c generated by the thrusters is given by
where u Ti is the commanded opening of the i th thruster.
Reaction Wheel Model
The torque generated by the i th RW is modelled as
where S R {1, 2, . . . N R } is a set of all RW indices, u Ri is the commanded control torque, η Rai is a zero-mean Gaussian white-noise introduced to model torque effects caused, e.g., by variations of motor voltage frequency and DC coil resistance, and T Rfi is the friction torque in ball bearings of the wheel. We model the friction torque as
where µ 1 > 0 and µ 2 > 0 are appropriate constants, and ω Ri is the angular speed of the i th RW satisfyinġ
where J Ri is the constant inertia of the i th RW. In (5), the term associated with µ 1 and µ 2 aims at modelling Coulomb and viscous friction of the i th RW, respectively.
Finally, the total torque about the CoM of the s/c generated by the RWs is given by
where θ(·, ·) is the same function as defined for (2), however now rotating the i th RW directional vector m Ri ∈ R 3×1 for a given RW misalignment angle Ri .
Spacecraft Model
The s/c is treated as a rigid body. Its rotational dynamics about the CoM is given by
is the s/c angular velocity, and h R ∈ R 3×1 is the s/c angular momentum vector associated with the RWs, i.e.,
The s/c motion is parametrized by a unit quaternion, q T [q vec1 q vec2 q vec3 q sca ] , q T q = 1, representing the s/c attitude with respect to an inertial frame of reference. The s/c kinematics is given bẏ
and ω X , ω Y , ω Z are the elements of ω S representing the s/c rotational rates around its body-fixed X, Y , Z axes.
Sensor Model
For FDI purposes, two high-precision star trackers (STRs), angular rate measurement unit (RMU), and dedicated tachometers for each RW are considered. STRs and RMU are assumed to be fault-free as quick FDI strategies exist.
The sensor model for the i th STR, the RMU, and the RW tachometers is, respectively, defined as follows q meas stri = (q ⊗ ϑ( stri )) ⊗ ϕ(η stri ),
where ω f R will be defined later, q meas stri , ω meas S , ω meas R are the measurements, and η stri , η rmu , η Rm are the measurement noises, assumed to be independent zero-mean Gaussian random variables. In (12), '⊗' denotes quaternion multiplication, ϑ(·) is a function of the misalignment angle stri , and ϕ(·) is a function of noise η stri defined in Euler angles. These functions are used to manipulate (rotate) the true quaternion q in order to mimic the STR misalignment and noise, respectively, while preserving quaternion unity.
In (13), θ(·, ·) rotates the measured s/c angular rate vector (ω S ) for a given RMU misalignment angle rmu .
Fault Model
Four distinct thruster fault types are considered: thruster leakage, stuck-open/-closed thruster, and loss of effectiveness (LoE) of all thrusters simultaneously.
The first three faults are modeled as (Fonod et al., 2015a )
, and the index f denotes the faulty case. The scalar variable φ i models the fault for the i th thruster as
Here, χ i aims at modelling different fault types, i.e.,
stuck-open 0, stuck-closed max{m leaki , u Ti }, propellant leakage where m leaki is the i th thruster leakage magnitude.
The LoE fault represents a decrease in propellant supply pressure feeding all the thrusters. Therefore, a LoE fault will affect all thrusters simultaneously, i.e.,
Two type of RW faults are considered. The first considers an increment of the measurement realized by the tachometer sensor, i.e.,
and m measi > 1 representing tachometer scale increment.
The second considered RW fault is an increment of the RW friction. Two friction types are considered, viscous friction (f v ) and Coulomb friction (f c ). Both f v and f c can vary differently in a faulty situations. Thus, the following fault model for the i th RW friction torque T Rfi is considered
if faulty Here, m v > 1 and m c > 1 is the magnitude of the viscous and Coulomb friction factor, respectively.
PROPOSED FDI STRATEGY
The proposed FDI strategy is based on a model-based residual generation, statistical change detection, and signature matrix matching. A generalized likelihood ratio (GLR) algorithm monitors each residual signal and compares them with fixed thresholds to determine fault presence. To decide whether the fault occurred in the thrusters or in a particular RW, including the type of the RW fault, the isolation logic matches the output of the thresholding process with the columns of a predefined signature matrix.
State Estimation
Before defining the residual signal, we first design a state estimator to estimate the following state vector
where T T Rf [TRf 1 . . . T Rf N R ] and δg ∈ R 3×1 stands for quaternion error. The filter employed here to estimate x is a mix of an extended Kalman filter (EKF) and a multiplicative EKF (MEKF). The EKF is used to estimate ω S , ω R , and T Rf , whereas MEKF is used to estimate δg.
Due to the quaternion unity constraint, q cannot be directly estimated using EKF. Alternatively, additive EKF or MEKF can be employed, see Markley (2004) . Due to large slews realized by the s/c, the MEKF is preferred as it estimates the quaternion errors (δg), which are considered to be small and easily linearized without loosing accuracy.
To proceed, we define the total control input vector u as u T u T T u T R . To propagate the estimated statex, the following equation will be considereḋ
being the misalignment-free matrix mapping the estimated RWs' torque contributions into the s/c body-fixed frame;T T andT R being defined aŝ
, andT Rfi is modelled as a random walk driven by zero-mean white-noise η Rfi .
The filter's time propagation step is done in a continuous time. The estimated state (x k−1 ) and covariance (P k−1 ) from the previous time step are propagated to the current time step (x − k and P − k ), assuming constant control input (u k−1 ), by integrating the following system of equations ẋ = f (x, u)
where
is the Jacobian matrix of the state and Q is the artificial process noise covariance matrix
, ε being a small constant, and S F , S Ra , and S Rf being double sided power spectral densities of η F , η Ra , and η Rf , respectively.
All sensor measurements (12)-(14) are exploited for estimation purposes. These measurements are only available in discrete time and are, for convenience, lumped into z T k = (δg meas str1 ) T (δg meas str2 ) T (ω meas S ) T (ω meas R ) T , (21) where the i th attitude error measurement, δg meas stri , is expressed as a Gibbs vector
where · vec and · sca , respectively, extracts the vector and scalar part of the enclosed quaternion. In (22), (q − k ) −1 denotes the quaternion inverse ofq − k . In parallel to the propagation in time of (20), the estimated full attitude (q) also needs to be propagated in time fromq k−1 toq − k by integratingq = 1 2 W (ω S )q, where W (·) was defined in (11). Once z k becomes available, the state and the covariance matrix are updated as followŝ
σ str1 , σ str2 , σ rmu , and σ Rm are the standard deviations of η str1 , η str2 , η rmu , and η Rm , respectively. Note that in the measurement noise covariance matrix R, the measurement noise variances of the STRs are divided by 4 to account for the Gibbs vector transformation.
The Gibbs vector δĝ is transformed into the global attitude representation, while preserving the unity quaternion constraints, usinĝ
After each measurement update, δĝ needs to be reset to zero explicitly, i.e., δĝ = 0 3×1 .
In this paper, we modify the standard measurement update step equation of the Kalman filter to account for proper implementation of the friction torque estimatê T Rfi , i.e., the i th friction torque estimate is updated as
where the sign of the friction torque estimate is determined byT
where γ > 0 is a fixed threshold accounting for the RW's friction characteristics. Finally, the magnitude of the friction torque is computed aŝ
pulls out the element associated with T Rfi from the enclosed vector. Remark 1. The sign of the estimated friction torque, see (27), is assumed to be opposite to the sign of the estimated angular rate. However, if the physical angular momentum is close to zero, the sign of the physical friction torque is not clear. Thus, if the magnitude of the estimated angular momentum is close to zero, the opposite sign of the last estimated torque is considered to reduce zero crossing time.
Residual Signal Generation
We define the residual signal r ∈ R N S ×1 as follows
where (28) stands for the "pseudo-measured" friction torque vector, withT Rfi being calculated using the RW friction torque model (5), which depends on the estimated angular rate of the RW, i.e.,
Remark 2. It can be seen from (28) that attitude-related residuals are not generated. Such residuals could be used, for instance, to detect and isolate faults affecting STRs.
Fault Detection Algorithm
The residual signal defined in (28) has in total N S = 3 + 2N R components. To detect fault presence, we employ the well-known GLR test to detect changes in the mean value of each residual component r i , i ∈ S S {1, 2, . . . , N S }.
The GLR algorithm evaluates the log-likelihood between two hypotheses H 0 (fault-free case) and H 1 (faulty case).
It works at discrete time instances k and with a moving time window M . If the i th residual signal sequence can be assumed independent and Gaussian, then the decision function for the i th residual signal is given as follows Blanke et al. (2006) 
where µ 0i and σ 0i is the mean and standard deviation of the i th residual signal in fault-free case, respectively.
Finally, the decision test for the i th residual signal is defined as follows
where Υ i > 0 is a fixed threshold selected by the designer.
Fault Isolation Algorithm
Once a fault is detected, the FDI system must identify in which actuator or sensor the fault has occurred. The isolation logic is achieved by comparing a decision vector 
Remark 3. It is obvious from Table 1 that thruster fault isolation was not considered. Thruster fault isolation was extensively tackled in the literature, see for instance Fonod et al. (2015b) ; Pittet et al. (2016) and references therein.
SIMULATION RESULTS
Realistic s/c parameters and assumptions are considered for simulation purposes. We assume a set of N R = 4 identical (J Ri = J R , ∀i ∈ S R ) RWs placed in a classical pyramidal configuration with a tilt angle α. Thus, the nominal RW configuration matrix is given by
Furthermore, a set of N T = 12 identical (F Ni = F N , ∀i ∈ S T ) thrusters is considered, which can generate torques in all three degrees of freedom.
The FDI strategy presented in the previous section is implemented in the GAFE 1 , a Matlab/Simulink based simulator for early phase FDI and Recovery (FDIR) design and verification & validation. Some relevant s/c and FDI related parameters are summarized in Table 2 . In the simulated scenario, the s/c is placed in a halo orbit around L2, the second Lagrange point of the Sun-Earth system. In this orbit, the main disturbance torque (T D T D ) affecting the s/c is the solar radiation pressure, which is assumed to be constant. The simulated scenario comprises four (shorten) inertially-fixed observation phases connected by three attitude slews, see Fig. 1 . The total duration of the scenario is approx. 9000 s. 
FDI Performance Indices
The performance of the proposed FDI strategy is evaluated in terms of the following indices:
Correct detection: a fault is correctly detected if λ = λ c . False alarm: a false alarm occurs if λ c = 0 N S ×1 and λ i = 1 for any i ∈ S S . Miss detection: a fault is miss-detected if a detectable fault 2 occurs, i.e., λ c = 0 N S ×1 , and λ = 0 N S ×1 throughout the entire simulation. Correct/Miss isolation at • equipment level: a fault is correctly/miss identified to be either in the thrusters or in the RWs. • component level: if fault is correctly/miss identified to be due to a particular faulty tachometer or due to an increase of the RW friction torque (only for RWs).
Detection time for
• thrusters (leakage and stuck-open) and RWs: time between fault occurrence and its detection. • thrusters (LoE and stuck-closed): time between the faulty thruster is activated for the first time after fault occurrence and time of fault detection.
Sample Run Simulation Example
A sample test case scenario, where a friction torque fault is introduced at t f = 2090.9 s for the 2nd RW with m v = 17.98 and m c = 5.05, is considered here. Figure 2 depicts the resulting residuals for nominal s/c values. It can be observed from this figure that around t = 2100 s, the residual corresponding to the 2nd RW friction torque increases considerably. The effect is even more clear when examining Fig. 3 , which shows the associated GLR signals together with the fixed thresholds (constant horizontal lines matching the GLR signals' color code).
2 A fault is detectable if it has an actual effect on the spacecraft. The proposed FDI strategy correctly reports the fault presence at t = 2091.8 s (0.9 s detection delay) and also correctly identifies the affected equipment (RWs) and component (increased friction in the 2nd RW).
Monte Carlo Analysis
Two Monte Carlo (MC) campaigns are presented next. The first (second) campaign aims at demonstrating the FDI performance without (with) considering model uncertainties. Both campaigns assume measurement noises and consist of 150 simulation runs per fault type. In each run, the time of fault occurrence (t f ) and the fault magnitudes (m i , i ∈ {leak, loe, meas, v, c}) vary uniformly in the defined interval, see Table 3 . 1, 9] 
The model uncertainties follow a normal distribution with standard deviations given in Table 3 . Here, σ J and σ str , σ rmu , σ T , σ R is the standard deviation of the s/c principal moments of inertia and of the misalignment angles ( ) for the two STRs, RMU, thrusters, and RWs, respectively. It should be noted that the implemented FDI strategy was tuned for the uncertainty-free scenario.
The results for the MC campaign without and with uncertainties is summarized in Table 4 and Thruster leakage shows relatively high ratio of correct detections, but also quite high detection time and low ratio of correct equipment isolations. This is due to the fact that some cases were run with m leak close to zero, which produced very small amount of torque, see Fig. 4 . Similar reasoning holds for LoE fault type when m loe is very small and its effect on the s/c is negligible. Regarding RW faults, in general, very good results can be observed for correct detection/isolation ratios and for mean detection times. The large variance associated with the detection time of the friction fault is caused by a single simulation case, where the Coulomb factor was increased only by 1.4% and its time to detection was 100 times greater than the rest of the simulation cases. The detection time of the RW tachometer fault does not show any correlation with the magnitude of the fault, see Fig. 5 . It can be also seen that the fault type (friction or tachometer fault) is not correctly isolated when a slew in X-axis is performed, but this only occurs for five cases. More tests would be required to confirm any clear correlation. Fig. 4 . MC results for thruster leakage faults.
CONCLUSIONS
An FDI strategy to detect and isolate a class of AOCS faults for an agile spacecraft is presented. The strategy differs from usual schemes by being able to handle multiple actuators working simultaneously and to distinguish different types of faults of the same equipment. The performance of the proposed FDI scheme is evaluated with respect to various noise sources and uncertainties. MC simulation results revealed promising results in terms of good detection/isolation rates and short detection times.
